Book Chapters
‘‘Overtaking on the Curve’? Defense AI in China’. In Heiko Borchert et al (eds), The Very Long Game: 25 Case Studies on the Global State of Defense AI (Springer, 2024) (The Very Long Game: 25 Case Studies on the Global State of Defense AI | SpringerLink)
‘China’s Industrial Policy for Semiconductors’. In Rogier Creemers et al (eds), The Emergence of China’s Smart State (Rowman and Littlefield, 2023) (https://rowman.com/WebDocs/OA_Creemers_Emergence_9781538184417.pdf)
‘The CPC and Sovereignty in a Digitally Connected World’. In Frank N. Pieke and Bert Hofman (eds). CPC Futures: The New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (NUS Press, 2022) (https://epress.nus.edu.sg/cpcfutures)
Reports
‘The AI-Robotics Revolution, China-US Rivalry and Southeast Asia’. ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute (2025) 2025/74 “The AI-Robotics Revolution, China-US Rivalry and Southeast Asia” by John Lee – ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
‘Evaluating Data Security in Chinese Drones and Smart Vehicles’. China Knowledge Network & Leiden Asia Centre (April 2025) https://www.chinakennisnetwerk.nl/publications/evaluating-data-security-chinese-drones-and-smart-vehicles
‘The Rising Role of Chinese Firms in Southeast Asia’s Automotive Supply Chain’. ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute (2024) https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/trends-in-southeast-asia/the-rising-role-of-chinese-firms-in-southeast-asias-automotive-supply-chain-by-john-lee/
‘Lithography: Is the EU’s Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment a Strategic Chokepoint?
’, and ‘Chips: Automotive Chips: a European Chokepoint?’ (with Jan-Peter Kleinhans) In ‘Reverse Dependency: Making Europe’s Digital Technological Strengths Indispensable to China.’ Digital Power China (DPC) research consortium, 2024. (https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/DPC%20-%20GESAMT_Final.pdf)
‘China and the Industrial Internet of Things’. Leiden Asia Centre, 2023. (https://leidenasiacentre.nl/china-and-the-industrial-internet-of-things/)
‘“Overtaking on the Curve?” Defense AI in China’ The Defense AI Observatory, 2023. (https://defenseai.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/daio_study2313_overtaking_on_the_curve_john_lee.pdf )
‘Finding Firmer Ground: The Role of High Technology in U.S.-China Relations.’ The Carter Center, 2023. (https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2023/china-020723.html)
‘China Semiconductor Observatory – Baseline Report’ (2023) (https://www.stiftung-nv.de/en/publication/china-semiconductor-observatory-baseline-report)
‘Challenges of a rising Chinese chip design ecosystem.’ (with Jan-Peter Kleinhans) In ‘Europe’s Strategic Technology Autonomy From China.’ German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 2023. (https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/europes-strategic-technology-autonomy-china)
‘China-Russia Cooperation in Advanced Technologies: The Future Global Balance of Power and the Limits of ‘Unlimited’ Partnership.’ Australia-China Relations Institute (UTS:ACRI), 2022 (https://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/china-russia-cooperation-advanced-technologies-future-global-balance-power-and-limits)
‘Strategic Settings for 6G: Pathways for China and the US.’ International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022 (https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2022/08/strategic-settings-for-6G-pathways-for-china-and-the-US)
‘Cyberspace Governance in China: Evolution, Features and Future Trends.’ IFRI – Institut français des relations internationales, 2022 (https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/asie-visions/cyberspace-governance-china-evolution-features-and-future)
‘China’s Standardisation System: trends, implications and case studies in emerging technologies.’ (with Eric Zhang and Rogier Creemers) Leiden Asia Centre, 2022 (https://leidenasiacentre.nl/chinas-standardisation-system-trends-implications-and-case-studies-in-emerging-technologies/)
‘A Brittle “Silicon Shield:” Security Implications of Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry’. In German Marshall Fund,. ‘Next-generation Perspectives on Taiwan’ (May 2022) https://www.gmfus.org/news/next-generation-perspectives-taiwan
“Europe’s dependence on Chinese semiconductor manufacturing.” (with Jan-Peter Kleinhans) In ‘China’s Digital Power: Assessing the Implications for the EU.’ Digital Power China research consortium (DPC) , 2022 (https://timruhlig.eu/ctf/assets/x93kiko5rt7l/4uiZoNQtRkni5KfuNDrBbx/fd52e3320cfe21e6b304ad31d81279d8/DPC-full_report-FINAL.pdf)
‘The Internet of Things: Chinas Rise and Australia’s Choices.’ Lowy Institute, 2021 (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/internet-things-chinas-rise-and-australias-choices)
‘China’s rise in semiconductors and Europe: Recommendations for policy makers’ (with Jan-Peter Kleinhans) MERICS and Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, 2021 (https://merics.org/en/report/chinas-rise-semiconductors-and-europe-recommendations-policy-makers)
“Mapping China’s semiconductor ecosystem in global context: Strategic dimensions and conclusions.” (with Jan-Peter Kleinhans) MERICS and Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, 2021 (https://merics.org/en/report/mapping-chinas-semiconductor-ecosystem-global-context-strategic-dimensions-and-conclusions)
‘The Connection of Everything: China and the Internet of Things.’ MERICS, 2021 (https://merics.org/en/report/connection-everything-china-and-internet-things)
“The CCP’s Next Century.” MERICS, 2021. (https://merics.org/en/report/ccps-next-century-expanding-economic-control-digital-governance-and-national-security)
“What should Australia do about PRC-US technology competition?” China Matters, 2019 (https://chinamatters.org.au/policy-brief/policy-brief-november-2019/)
‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: An Australian Response.’ Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008 (https://www.aspi.org.au/report/shanghai-cooperation-organisation-australian-response)
Journals
“Taiwan: Microchips as a Life Insurance Policy”. Limes, Italian Review of Geopolitics, 2021 (https://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/i-microchip-come-polizza-per-la-vita)
“If Hong Kong jumps, the alternative is Shenzhen”. Limes, Italian Review of Geopolitics, 2019 (https://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/se-hong-kong-salta-lalternativa-e-Shenzhen)
‘South China Sea: The Problems of an Ambitious Award’. Asian Politics & Policy 9(1) January 2017 (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.12301/epdf)
Commentaries
‘The AI-Robotics Revolution, China-US Rivalry and Southeast Asia’. Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2025 The AI-Robotics Revolution, China-US Rivalry and Southeast Asia | FULCRUM
‘What China’s chip strategy gets right’. Binding Hook, 2025 What China’s chip strategy gets right
‘The Sino-US Trade War Presents Hard Choices for Southeast Asia’. Fulcrum, 2025. The Sino-US Trade War Presents Hard Choices for Southeast Asia | FULCRUM
‘Southeast Asia Can Navigate Growing Fractures in Global Automotive Sector’. Fulcrum, 2025. Southeast Asia Can Navigate Growing Fractures in Global Automotive Sector | FULCRUM
‘The ‘Second China Shock’ and its Implications for Southeast Asia’. Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024 (https://fulcrum.sg/the-second-china-shock-and-its-implications-for-southeast-asia/)
‘Southeast Asia and the Chip Wars: Navigating a Decoupling World’. Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024 (https://fulcrum.sg/southeast-asia-and-the-chip-wars-navigating-a-decoupling-world/)
‘The “Small Yard, High Fence” Mirage: Why Sino-U.S. Tech Competition Will Not Be Contained.’ Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024 (https://fulcrum.sg/the-small-yard-high-fence-mirage-why-sino-u-s-tech-competition-will-not-be-contained/)
‘US-China decoupling: Beijing has options beyond Russia in navigating geopolitics of technology.’ South China Morning Post, 2023 (https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3202213/us-china-decoupling-beijing-has-options-beyond-russia-navigating-geopolitics-technology)
‘China and Russia: A Lasting Partnership in High Technology’. Directions, Cyber Digital Europe, 2023 (https://directionsblog.eu/china-russia-lasting-partnership-high-technology )
‘Will US chip controls work on China?’ Think China, 2023 (https://www.thinkchina.sg/will-us-chip-controls-work-china)
‘Taiwan, China and Semiconductors.’ Directions, Cyber Digital Europe, 2022 (https://directionsblog.eu/taiwan-china-and-semiconductors/ )
‘Ask the Experts: Is China’s Semiconductor Strategy Working?’ LSE IDEAS, 2022 (https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2022/09/01/is-chinas-semiconductor-strategy-working/)
‘China, Australia, and the Internet of Things.’ Lowy Institute, 2021 (China, Australia, and the Internet of Things (lowyinstitute.org))
‘Washington will rethink its foreign chip strategy.’ Oxford Analytica, 2021 (https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/ES265681/Washington-will-rethink-its-foreign-chip-strategy)
“Blocking the Flow: Data legislation and the EU-US-China triangle.” RUSI, 2021 (https://www.transatlantic-dialogue-on-china.rusi.org/article/international-data-transfers)
“Decoupling: Severed Ties and Patchwork Globalization”. MERICS / European Chamber of Commerce in China, 2021. (https://merics.org/en/report/decoupling-severed-ties-and-patchwork-globalisation)
“Would China Invade Taiwan for TSMC?” (with Jan-Peter Kleinhans) The Diplomat, 2020 (https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/would-china-invade-taiwan-for-tsmc/)
“Taiwan, Chips, and Geopolitics: Part 1” (with Jan-Peter Kleinhans) The Diplomat, 2020 (https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/taiwan-chips-and-geopolitics-part-1/)
“The Global War for 5G Heats up”. The Diplomat, 2020 (https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/the-global-war-for-5g-heats-up/)
“Principles of Australian grand strategy for China.” (with Peter Layton) The China Story, 2020 (https://www.thechinastory.org/principles-of-australian-grand-strategy-for-china/)
“China Steps up the Long March to 5G” The Diplomat, 2020 (https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/china-steps-up-the-long-march-to-5g)
“Will China reinvent the Internet?” The China Story, 2020 (https://www.thechinastory.org/will-china-reinvent-the-internet/)
‘Decoupling from China: Cutting the Gordian Knot’. Lowy Interpreter, 2018 (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/decoupling-china-cutting-gordian-knot)
‘Killing Chimerica’. Lowy Interpreter, 19/10/2018; (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/killing-chimerica)
‘The Twelve Regions of China: Past and Present’. The Diplomat, 2017 (series of seventeen articles published July-August 2017); (http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/the-12-regions-of-china/)
‘The Rise of China’s Tech Sector: The Digital Great Game’. Lowy Interpreter, 2017 (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rise-china-s-tech-sector-digital-great-game)
‘The Rise of China’s Tech Sector: The Making of an Internet Empire’. Lowy Interpreter, 2017 (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rise-china-s-tech-sector-making-internet-empire)
‘The New Chinese Diaspora’. Lowy Interpreter, 2017 (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-chinese-diaspora)
‘Floating nuclear plants and safety zones: Another looming problem in the South China Sea?’ Lowy Interpreter, 2016 (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/floating-nuclear-plants-and-safety-zones-another-looming-problem-south-china-sea)
‘China’s interests at stake in the South China Sea ruling.’ East Asia Forum, 2016 (http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/08/02/chinas-interests-at-stake-in-the-south-china-sea-ruling)
‘Where to for China’s “historic rights” in the South China Sea?’ The Diplomat, 2016 (http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/what-now-for-chinas-historic-rights-in-the-south-china-sea/)
‘The China’s diaspora’s role in the rise of China’. East Asia Forum, 2016 (http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/14/the-chinese-diasporas-role-in-the-rise-of-china/)
‘Innovation in China: more than a fast follower?’ The Diplomat, 2016 (http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/innovation-in-china-more-than-a-fast-follower/)
East West Futures Consulting 